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This paper analyzes the influence of exchange rate regimes on fiscal performance, focusing on the 
difference between fixed and flexible exchange rates.  
For these ends, a sample of 83 countries for the 1974-1998 period, the GMM methodology for dynamic 
proposal panel models proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and diverse exchange rate classifications 
are used. In relation to the latter, this paper discusses recent regime classifications and proposes a new 
exchange rate classification that permits to cover possible inconsistencies between the commitment of 
the central bank and its observed behavior. 
The results suggest that the influence of regimes on fiscal performance depend on the international 
context, specifically the possibility of indebtedness and of the characteristics of the international finance 
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possibly subject to contagion effect. The same functioning of the international finance system can, 
through their potential sanction, achieve greater discipline in economies with fixed regimes that wish to 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Before the fall of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, most of the countries had fixed exchange 
regimes. Since then, countries have experienced with varied exchange rate regimes. The 
evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with the different regimes has been the source 
of many debates and continuous to be one of the most important in international economy in 
our days. In theoretical terms, it is difficult to establish a univocal consensus on this relation 
product of the many links –that are partly reinforced and partly counteracted– among the 
different exchange rate regimes and the macroeconomic variables. Precisely, the relevance of 
the empirical analysis consists of trying to quantify the relative importance of the different 
relations involved. 
There are many empirical studies that analyze the impact of exchange rate regimes on 
different macroeconomic variables such as inflation and its volatility, money growth, real 
interest rate, product growth and its volatility. An issue that has not been deeply analyzed is 
the relation between exchange rate regimes and fiscal performance. The aim of this paper is to 
set out the relative importance of these links, specifically analyzing the regime influence on 
fiscal behavior. 
Apart from informal discussions, the few existing empirical studies can be divided in two 
groups according to the type of analysis. On the one hand, the first group comprises papers 
like those of Tornell and Velasco (1995b) and Alfaro (1999), which recur to the analysis of 
episodes for certain countries –generally from Latin America-. Even if these can provide 
evidence in favor or against some hypotheses, it is not possible to isolate the effects of the 
different variables involved. On the other hand, the second group is formed by research such 
as that of Tornell and Velasco (1995a), Bazzoni and Nashashibi (1994) and Adam et al. (2000), 
who limit the analysis to the Sub-Sahara region in Africa to eliminate potential endogeneity 
problems in regime choice. This is because the countries that belong to the Franc Zone 
maintained a fixed regime from 1948 to 1994 and because this choice was due to political 
issues associated to colonial history and not to economic motives. 
This paper surpasses previous analysis limitations covering a maximum sample of 83 
countries during the 1974-1998 period. At the same time that it finds evidence on the 
influence of exchange rate regimes on fiscal performance, it provides a possible criterion for 
regime election. 
The empirical analysis expands and improves previous literature in many regards: 
•  It allows, unlike episode analysis, to work out the effect of exchange rate regimes on fiscal 
performance considering other variables that can affect this performance.   4
•  It advances towards the use of a dynamic methodology of estimation (Generalized 
Method of Moments), which considers endogeneity problems and unobserved specific effects, 
which generate bias in estimations performed by fixed effects if the dependant variable has a 
strong persistence or temporal inertia. 
•  The correction of potential endogeneity problems, together with the inclusion of variables 
that affect regime election, makes it possible to incorporate economies of different regions. 
•  It makes an extensive use of available information on the classification of exchange rate 
regimes, widening the dichotomy "fixed vs. flexible” according to de jure classification 
compiled by IMF, and of new contributions by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) in 
relation to the classification according to behavior. In this sense, a new classification of 
exchange rate regimes is realized, making it possible to cover probable inconsistencies 
between the commitment of the Central Bank -of intervening and subordinating its monetary 
policy to the currency market- and its behavior. 
•  It evaluates fiscal performance in many ways -total deficit, primary deficit, total 
expenditure, primary expenditure and revenues-, trying to capture not only the effect of the 
regime on an aggregated variable –defined on the basis of other variables- such as deficit, but 
also on “original” variables allowing to distinguish potential transmission mechanisms. Also, 
total and primary concepts of fiscal variables are used, making it possible to indirectly 
observe the links between the variables and the debt interests. 
•  Diverse sub-periods that characterize the level of capital market integration, indebtedness 
possibility and the dominant finance structure are considered, analyzing if these 
characteristics modify the influence of the regime on fiscal performance. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 does a revision on the most representative 
theoretical and empirical works; section 3 justifies econometric methodology choice; section 4 
presents the macroeconomic variables and diverse exchange classifications that are used; 
section 5 shows the econometric results; section 6 presents the conclusions. 
2  THEORETICAL DISCUSSION  
Traditionally, the explanations about exchange rate policies were based on the theory of 
optimal areas of Mundell (1960 and 1961), determining how different exchange rate regimes 
could be desirable for countries with different characteristics. For example, small and open 
countries having economies that are not very subjected to price shocks should have a more  
fixed regime. Even though the traditional approximation was extremely useful in the past, it 
does not prove to be that useful nowadays given that it considers the choice of regime as if it   5
were made in vacuo, where each regime can be instantaneously placed and indefinitely 
sustained. As history shows, exchange rate regimes are not chosen once and forever but are 
frequently changed, either voluntarily or involuntarily.  
More recently, attention has been centered in the potential credibility effects of the exchange 
rate policy, emerging a trade-off between credibility and flexibility. The theoretical studies 
that analyze the relation between regimes and fiscal performance cover mainly four fields of 
study of Economics: dynamic stochastic models, the so-called stabilization policies, issues 
linked to political economy and studies that relate the recent crisis of the nineties with 
growing integration and volatility of the capitals market. 
  The first group consists of those papers based on dynamic stochastic models of general 
equilibrium, which analyze the results of technological, monetary and government 
expenditure shocks under different exchange rate regimes. Some of them are: Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995b and 1998), Bachetta and van Wincoop (1999) and Devereux (1999). The latter 
outlines that the effect of the exchange rate regime on macroeconomic variables depends on 
the regime as well as on the monetary policy that is being implemented. 
  The second group, which is related to stabilization policies, includes many papers among 
which are those by Aghevli et al. (1991), Frenkel et al. (1991), Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), and 
Weber (1991). Their conventional vision supports the idea that fixed regimes provide more 
fiscal discipline than the flexible ones due to the adoption of lax fiscal policies, would lead to 
an exhaustion of reserves and consequently to the collapse of the peg. As presumably, the 
eventual collapse of the fixed exchange rate would imply a big political cost for the policy 
maker, this one would be disciplined, causing unsustainable fiscal policies not to occur in 
equilibrium. In other words devaluation is not an option, which is of course an 
oversimplification, because as history repeatedly shows, fixed regimes usually fail to impose 
discipline and generally end in devaluation crises1. 
In relation to a most recent branch linked to issues of political economy, Tornell and Velasco 
(1994, 1995a and 1995b), Alfaro (1999), Velasco (1997), and Alberola and Molina (2000) can be 
named. Tornell and Velasco (1994, 1995a and 1995b) support that there are empirical and 
theoretical problems with the kind of lines of thought exposed by conventional papers on 
policy stabilization. They consider a fiscal authority prone to spend more than what is socially 
desirable and with a lower discount rate after a certain moment –for example, because of 
uncertainty about re-election- and, a central bank that can precommit not to finance the 
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deficits incurred by the fiscal authority for a finite period of time. They conclude that the 
difference in fiscal behavior among regimes lies in the intertemporal distribution of the costs. 
Under fixed regimes, unsound policies are manifested in falling reserves or exploding debts, 
making their costs effective only when the situation is unsustainable. While with flexible 
regimes, they are immediately manifested through movements in the exchange rate and the 
price level. Therefore, being inflation costly for the fiscal authority, flexible regimes can 
provide more fiscal discipline. It is important to outline that the previous result depends, on 
one hand, on the possibility of intertemporal choice for the policymaker, because if it does not 
have access to credit and/or if it had insufficient reserves, money-financed deficits would 
inevitably cause an immediate depreciation, regardless of the exchange rate regime. On the 
other hand, it is essential that the central bank can precommit not to accommodate the wishes 
of the fiscal authority only for a finite period of time because, if this commitment were 
forever, the equivalence between regimes found by Helpman (1981) would persist. 
Velasco (1997) develops a model analogous with that discussed in Alesina and Drazen (1991) 
in which he rationalizes debt bubbles and post-stabilization programs. That is, it gives 
rationality to the phrase “things must be really bad before they start to get better again”. So, 
he recurs to a model with interest groups where the resources of the government are seen as 
common property. On the one hand, he finds that deficits can be held through fiscal reform, 
but that will only happen after a long and intense period of government indebtedness and, on 
the other hand, that the deficit bias will be greater as greater is the fragmentation level of the 
interest groups. 
From a distributive point of view, Alfaro (1999) justifies why governments hold policies that 
are presumed not to be sustainable in the long run. Considering heterogeneity in the 
population as regards its dotations, whether they have transable or non-transable goods, it 
argues that the real exchange rate appreciation associated to stabilization plans improves the 
position of the latter. 
Since the exchange rate and finance crises of the nineties, there has been a great upsurge of 
literature that analyzes the role of growing integration and volatility of capital markets upon these 
crises. Some of these papers are by Chang and Velasco (1998), Meng and Velasco (1999), 
Chang (1999), and Velasco (1996). In general, they analyze credibility policy problems and 
finance structure problems combined with herd behavior, contagion effect and financial 
frictions as main elements in recent crises. Chang (1999) divides the recent disscusions that try 
to explain the crises in growing capital markets into two groups. On the one hand, he 
considers those under the “bad policy view” that, in agreement with the spirit of Krugman’s  
first generation crises (1979), suggest that crises are the inevitable result of inconsistent   7
policies. On the other hand, he considers those under the “financial panic view”, who 
maintain that fundamentals do not seem to be good predictors and that, on the contrary, the 
expectations of the market subject to herd behaviors and contagion effect are the key to 
understand the nineties’crises.   
Chang and Velasco (1998) analyze interaction between banking fragility and exchange rate 
regimes, basing themselves on microfundamentals of the financial system, taking as 
benchmark Diamond and Dybvig’s model (1983). They find that this fragility is evident in 
fixed regimes. A drastic change in public trust can cause a fall in banking deposits and, 
possibly, a run on deposits. Under fixed regimes, the central bank has the following trade-off. 
If nothing were done, a wave of banking bankruptcy would occur and consequently a serious 
interruption of the economic activity. If it purveyed credits to the most affected banks, these 
credits would rapidly return to the central bank in the form of a greater demand of 
international reserves, causing the collapse of fixed exchange rate. On the contrary, with 
flexible regimes and a central bank acting as lender of last resort, banking runs on deposits 
originated by unfulfilled expectations can be eliminated.   
Velasco (1996) extends the Barro-Gordon model to a dynamic context in which the level of the 
state variable, in this case the debt stock, determines the sustainability of the fixed exchange 
rate. Considering that reputation matters and that there is a fixed cost for devaluation, he 
finds that fixed regime is sustainable if and only if the debt stock is sufficiently low. There is a 
debt rank in which multiple equilibriums are obtained, where the devaluation result depends 
on the expectations of the agents. While for a certain level of high debt, there is an 
equilibrium where the speculative attack occurs with positive probability, promoting the 
decrease in debt size on the side of the government. That is, for the fixed exchange rates to be 
really fixed, the debt must be smaller if investors are voluble -in the sense of being prone to 
panic-. 
The study of all this literature suggests many questions: Do fixed regimes provide more fiscal 
discipline than flexible ones? Does the possibility of government indebtedness modify the 
effect of exchange rate regimes on fiscal performance? Do greater integration and volatility of 
the current international financial system have any special effect on fiscal behavior in 
economies with fixed exchange rate regimes? Did stabilization programs of the eighties 
promote greater fiscal discipline? The aim of this paper is to respond to these questions and 
others that may arise as this analysis goes further.   8
3  ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
For the selection of the estimation method three aspects were considered. In the first place, 
issues concerning data. Due to the availability of panel data -which make it possible to retain 
all the information in relation to the use of annual averages - the presence of the country’s 
unobservable factors must be enabled. Secondly, particularities of the dependent variable 
must be considered. Fiscal performance in its diverse forms of measurement has a dynamic 
nature –as table 9-1 shows-, reason for which the methodology must allow for an inertia 
behavior of this variable. A third element is the so-called “reverse causality”. That is, as some 
of the explanatory variables are likely to be jointly determined with fiscal behavior, 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables must be controlled. 
 
Considering these aspects, the appropriate methodology to use is the Generalized-Method-of-
Moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panel data models developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). This estimator deals with country specific effects and potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. The control for endogeneity is achieved by using “internal 
instruments” (i.e., instruments based on lagged values of the explanatory variables).  
What follows is a brief presentation and justification of the chosen methodology and its 
benefits as regards the frequently used alternatives. The dynamic nature of the fiscal 
performance (F) must be represented through a model containing lagged dependent variables 
among the regressors. To simplify the analysis, a simple autoregressive model with one lag 
period of the dependent variable is considered: 
it it t i it x F F υ β δ + + = −
'
1 ,   N i ,..., 1 =   T t ,..., 1 =   (1) 
Where  δ  is a scalar, 
'
it x of dimension 1xk represents a group of variables that potentially 
affect fiscal performance, and β  is of kx1. Assuming that the  it υ  follow a one-way error 
component model: 
it i it ν µ υ + =   (2) 
Where  i µ ~ IID ) , 0 (
2
µ σ  and  it ν ~ IID ) , 0 (
2
ν σ  are independent of each other and among 
themselves. 
In these dynamic models, the implications of the election of diverse estimation techniques 
have a different nature from those associated to static models. Since  it F  is a function of  i µ , 
1 , − t i F  is also a function of  i µ . Therefore,  1 , − t i F , a right-hand regressor in (1), is correlated 
with the error term. This renders the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator biased and 
inconsistent even if the  it ν  are not serially correlated. In relation to the Fixed Effect (FE)   9
estimator, the Within transformation wipes out the  i µ , though ( 1 , 1 , − − − t i t i F F ) where 
∑
=
− − − =
T
t
t i t i T F F
2
1 , 1 , ) 1 (  will still be correlated with  ) ( i it ν ν −  even if the  it ν  are not 
serially correlated. This is because  1 , − t i F  is correlated with  i ν  by construction. The latter 
average contains  1 , − t i ν which is obviously correlated with  1 , − t i F . In fact, the Within 
estimator will be biased and only if  ∞ → T  will the Within estimator of δ  and β  be 
consistent for the dynamic error component model. The same problem springs with the 
random effects Generalized Least Square estimator (GLS) because  ) ( 1 , 1 , − − − t i t i F F θ  will 
be correlated with  ) ( 1 , , − − t i t i υ θ υ . 
An alternative transformation that wipes out the individual effects, yet does not create 
the problem mentioned above, is the First Difference Transformation. In fact, Anderson 
and Hsiao (1981) suggested the following: first, differencing the model to get rid of  i µ , 
and then, using  ) ( 3 , 2 , 2 , − − − − = ∆ t i t i t i F F F  or  2 , − t i F  as an instrument for 
) ( 2 , 1 , 1 , − − − − = ∆ t i t i t i F F F . These instruments will not be correlated with 
1 , − − = ∆ t i it it ν ν ν  as long as the  it ν  themselves are not serially correlated. This 
instrumental variable estimation method leads to consistent but not necessarily efficient 
estimates of the parameters in the model, because it does not make use of all the available 
moment conditions as Ahn and Schmidt (1993) show, and it does not consider the 
differenced structure on residual disturbances ( it ν ∆ ). A methodology considering 
country specific effects and the bias of dynamic panel data models is the GMM estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator works in the following way: first, 
take first differences of a model like (1) which, generalized to a model containing k 









,   (3) 
Where  1 , − − = ∆ t i it it F F F . First differencing gets rid of the country specific effects, but leads 
by construction a correlation between the differenced lagged fiscal variable and the 
differenced error term. Therefore, these authors propose using lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables, including the lagged dependent variable, as instruments.   10
The GMM estimator will be consistent if the lagged levels of explanatory variables are valid 
instruments for differenced explanatory variables. This will hold if the error term is not 
serially correlated. These assumptions can be tested through the tests proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). The first is a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the 
overall validity of the instruments. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the 
model. The second is a test for serial correlation in the error term. If such test does not reject 
the null hypothesis of second order correlation absence, it can be concluded that the original 
error term does not have serial correlation. 
4  DATA 
The largest sample embraces a panel of 83 countries2 –21 countries OECD and 62 non OECD- 
for the 1974-1998 period. The source of data used for the macroeconomic and fiscal variables 
were  Macro Time Series (MTS) and Government Finance (GF) of the World Bank Global 
Development Network Growth Database (WB). The source of data of exchange rate regimes was 
the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions for de jure exchange 
rate classification and the Exchange Rate Classification Database b y  L e v y  Y e y a t i  a n d  
Sturzenegger (2000). 
4.1  Macroeconomic and fiscal variables 
Total deficit, primary deficit, total expenditure, primary expenditure and fiscal revenues are 
considered as fiscal performance measures, all of them as GDP percentage. The shock in trade 
terms, GDP per capita, openness, inflation rate, a dummy of hyperinflation and, several 
classifications of exchange regimes specifically discussed in the following sub-section are 
used as explanatory variables3. 
4.2  Exchange rate regimes classifications 
There are two points that should be taken into account when carrying out an exchange rate 
classification: 
•  The degree of detail in the de jure classification. While it is often spoken of the “fixed vs. 
flexible” dichotomy, the de jure classification available is broader, covering from currency 
boards or countries not having their own currency, to flexible exchange rate regimes with 
high, low or no intervention. 
                                                        
2 The complete list of countries included in this paper is presented in the Data Appendix 8.1. 
3 For more details regarding the building of variables see Data Appendix 8.2.   11
•  The criterion to follow when carrying out the classification. Economic literature shows 
two possible options to carry it out: a de jure classification, based on the commitment adopted 
by the central banks; and a de facto classification, product of the actual behavior. Neither of the 
methods is entirely satisfactory. The de facto classification has the advantage that it is based on 
the observed behavior, but does not make it possible to distinguish between stable nominal 
exchange rates resulting from the absence of shocks, and the stability produced by political 
actions counteracting the shocks. Because of this, it fails to capture what might be the essence 
of an exchange rate regime -the type of commitment of the central bank to intervene and 
subordinate its money policies to the currency market. The de jure classification captures this 
formal commitment, but fails to control policies, which are inconsistent with this 
commitment. 
Taking these two points into consideration, three exchange classifications are used:  
•  Initially, a three-category de jure classification is considered: fixed, intermediate and flexible. 
The fixed regimes cover: a single currency peg; SDR peg; other official basket pegs; and a 
secret basket peg, according to the IMF terminology. The intermediate group includes: 
cooperative arrangement, unclassified flexible, rule based, crawling peg and target zone. 
While the flexible group includes independent float and managed floating. 
There were two questions in this way of grouping: 
The first was associated to the managed float category. It was decided to consider it as 
floating because for the topics and variables involved it is more relevant to know whether 
there is a commitment on the part of the central bank or not than if they effectively intervene 
or not in the currency market. In fact, according to Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000), only 
a bit more than 30% of the countries said to have a floating exchange rate regime, behave as 
such. 
The second question is how to classify the countries participating in the European “snake” in 
the mid seventies and later in the EMS. These countries have fixed exchange rate regimes, but 
they float against other currencies. In agreement with other papers -Ghosh et al. (1997) and 
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000)-, it is classified as intermediate. 
•  The second exchange classification differentiates long or short term de jure fixed regimes, 
depending on whether they have been defined as such, at least five consecutive years, or not 
respectively. This leads to a four-category classification: longpeg,  shortpeg,  intermediate and 
flexible. 
•  The third exchange rate classification is the one suggested by this paper, which captures 
both the central bank commitment to intervene and subordinate its monetary policy to the   12
currency market, and the likely inconsistencies in its behavior. For this, de jure classification 
of the IMF and de facto classification by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000)4 are combined 
under a grouping criterion. 
Tables 9-3 up to 9-5 describe, through the “crossing” of de jure and de facto classifications, the 
main characteristics of the regimes for the 1974-1998 period in quantitative terms, while tables 
9-6 up to 9-8 do the same following some of the macroeconomic variables used in the 
analysis. Some of the most outstanding characteristics are: 
- An important proportion of the de facto inconclusive regimes are present for all the de jure 
exchange rate regimes, especially for fixed regimes (table 9-4). At the same time the greatest 
proportion of inconclusive regimes are concentrated in de jure fixed regimes (table 9-3). 
- While 63% of the regimes showing a flexible behavior are defined as such, just 28% of the 
ones behaving as fixed admit being so  (table 9-3). This behavior –paraphrasing Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000)- could be refer to as “fear of pegging”. And could result from a desire of 
reduction of exposure to speculative attacks associated to explicit compromises.  
- Excluding the inconclusive ones, while 62% of de jure flexible regimes behave as such, just 
39% of the fixed ones does so (table 9-5). This result shows an important difference between 
the central bank commitment to intervene and the behavior observed according to the 
exchange rate regimes. 
- The economies with de jure fixed regimes are open economies with low GDP per capita, 
especially for those which are also de facto fixed (tables 9-6 and 9-8). 
- As regards the inflationary performance, the de facto intermediate regimes show the highest 
rates for each de jure regime; and de facto fixed regimes have lower average rate than the 
flexible ones (table 9-7). 
On the basis of the characteristics mentioned above, the theoretical and empirical elements 
considered for building the new classification of exchange rate regimes are: 
- The categories’ diversity should balance a trade-off between greater information and 
restrictions imposed by econometric issues. 
- A clear difference between commitment and behavior, according to de jure exchange rate 
regimes, is observed, with greater divergence for fixed regimes. 
- The categories’ diversity should consider the performance or explanatory capacity of the 
different possible categories. For example, while it seems to be obvious that a country with 
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the possible bias towards the irrelevance of the significance of the regime. The outline of the criterion 
considered by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) is presented in table 9-2. 
In this paper the dirty floating categories and crawling peg by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) were 
grouped under de facto intermediate category.   13
a de jure fixed regime showing an intermediate or flexible behavior is inconsistent with this 
commitment, it is not clear that an economy with flexible regime, behaving as fixed, violates 
any kind of commitment which makes it inconsistent. 
The new suggested classification of exchange rate regimes -with the letters identifying the 
different categories- is presented in table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 
New classification of exchange rate regimes 
de facto Classification 
 
Fixed Intermediate Flexible  Inconclusive 
Fixed a  b  c  d 
Intermediate e  f  g  h  de jure Classification  
Flexible e f  g  h 
 
This new classification is composed of eight categories: 
• (a) de jure fixed regimes behaving consistently with the commitment. For example: Lesotho 
1980-1998, Bahrain 1992-1997, and Ireland 1976-1978. 
• (b)  de jure fixed regimes which, having behaved in the opposite way towards the 
commitment –have variations on their exchange rates–, had strong movements on their 
reserves. For example: Bolivia 1982-1985, Argentina 1975-1977, and Chile 1974-1976. 
• (c) de jure fixed regimes which, even if they suffer changes on their exchange rates, are not 
d e t e c t e d  o r  p u n i s h e d  f o r  s u c h  b e h a v i o r  a s  t h e y  d o  n o t  s h o w  g r e a t e r  c h a n g e s  o n  t h e i r  
reserve levels. For example: Poland 1992-1995, Burundi 1985-1991, and Sweden 1981-1982. 
• (d) A priori, they could be thought of as fixed regimes having stable economies, with no 
greater external shocks or credibility problems. For example: Australia 1974-1983, New 
Zealand 1974-1984, and The Bahamas 1974-1998. 
The remaining categories have been grouped according to their observed behavior, as in 
theoretical terms it is not evident that the disagreement between both classifications creates 
any kind of inconsistency. 
• (e) Economies behaving as fixed that do not want to be limited or judged by the rules 
governing the de jure fixed regimes. They are linked to the “fear to pegging” concept. For 
example: Finland 1992-1998, Ireland 1987-1998, Denmark 1981-1989, and New Zealand 
1992-1998.   14
• (f) They have important movements in their reserves, and changing and volatile exchange 
rates, but are not engaged with the exchange rate fixation. For example: Argentina 1981-
1985, Brazil 1987-1993, and Thailand 1997-1998. 
• (g) Within this classification, it is really close to pure flexible as it does have important 
variations in the exchange rate but little movement on its reserves. For example: the United 
States 1977-1998, Japan 1977-1998, Turkey 1981-1993, Chile 1992-1995, Uruguay 1986-1988 y 
1990-1996. 
• (h) They include stable economies with no important or strong-enough external shocks as to 
avoid greater effects on their exchange rates or reserves. For example: Belgium 1974-1998, 
Canada 1974-1997, Tunisia 1987-1998, and Costa Rica 1993-1998. 
5  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, the econometric results are presented. The inclusion of explanatory variables is 
not derived from a particular model. On the contrary, it is general enough as to test different 
hypotheses. The basic model is assessed for the 1974-1998 period and considers, in addition to 
the lagged of the dependent variable, the terms of trade shocks, the GDP per capita, and the 
exchange rate regimes as potential determinants of the fiscal variables. Later, the openness 
and the inflation are included as control variables. Then, the study advances in two ways: on 
the one hand, the model is evaluated at different sub-periods and, on the other hand, the 
exchange rate classification is enriched. 
It is worth mentioning that the Sargan test and the serial correlation test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis for almost all the models estimated through GMM, supporting the use of 
appropriate lags of the explanatory variables as instruments for the estimation. 
For a proper reading of the coefficients associated with exchange rate regimes, it is worth 
reminding that they refer to their differential effect compared to the flexible –de jure flexible in 
the IMF classification, and pure flexible for the new classification (category g)-. 
5.1  Importance in the choice of the estimation method 
Models 1 and 2 of tables 9-9 and 9-13 represent the most basic estimated model. They cover 
the 1974-1998 period and consider the current and past values of the shocks in exchange 
terms and of the GDP per capita as explanatory variables together with lags of the fiscal 
variable and the exchange regimes –fixed, intermediate and flexible.  Models 1 and 2 differ in 
the estimation methodology depending on whether it is FE or GMM respectively. The results 
show the great importance of the proper choice of the method. On the one hand, for all fiscal 
variables the estimate by FE increases the importance of the inertial behavior and, on the   15
other hand, the effect of the regimes suffers several changes not only in significance but also 
in direction and magnitude. 
5.2  Controlling endogeneity for variables that influence on the regime choice but 
not on the fiscal performance 
Model 2 makes it possible to isolate the effect of each variable, including the regimes, on the 
fiscal variable. However, this endogeneity control does not include variables having an 
incidence on the regime choice but not a direct influence on the fiscal behavior. In the FE 
estimation context this would be solved by the use of simultaneous equations for truncated 
endogenous variables as Maddala (1983) suggests. Due to the fact that this proceeding is not 
appropriate under GMM estimation, this type of variables were included in the regression 
equation as control variables, building model 3, in which openness an inflation are added as 
possible determinants of exchange regime, as many papers like Frieden’s et. al. (2000) and 
Ghosh’s et. al. (1997) suggest. 
Model 3 shows a strong persistence in all fiscal variables, with positive and significant 
coefficients. An improvement on the exchange terms increases the total and primary fiscal 
balance after many periods because of the increase in fiscal revenues and the decrease in 
expenditures, which is consistent with the standard neoclassic approximation through a tax-
smoothing model. However, in the short run the increase in the revenues is compensated by 
an increase in the expenditures causing a slight or null improvement in the fiscal balance, 
which can be justified with political economy models, in line with the evidence found by 
Tornell and Lane (1994) and Talvi and Vegh (2000). As regards the influence of exchange rate 
regimes, fixed ones show better fiscal performance over the total expenditure, total deficit and 
primary variables. These results would support the conventional view held by Aghevli et al. 
(1991), Frenkel et al. (1991), Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), and Weber (1991) according to which 
fixed regimes provide greater fiscal discipline. 
5.3  The role of international markets 
Important issues to be taken into account in order to properly analyze the exchange rate 
regime influence on the fiscal performance are indebtedness possibilities and the international 
capital market characteristics, especially as regards their level of integration, volatility and 
dominant financial structure. As described in the theoretical discussion, indebtedness 
possibilities make the possibility of intertemporal choice for the policymaker. Likewise, there 
is ample literature that analyzes how some changes in the international financial system 
modify its intrinsic functioning:   16
• Dominant financial structure change: while in the seventies and eighties the financial 
structure was dominated by banks, since the beginning of the nineties there has existed a 
great growth of institutions such as investment, pension and insurance funds which modify 
the link and rules between debtors and creditors. As Krueger (2002) explains, while in the 
eighties an important proportion of the emerging country debts were in charge of bank 
loans and the 85% of the creditors of the debt of a country could be gathered around a table, 
in the nineties the bond market has quadruplicated and bond holders are more numerous, 
anonymous and hard to coordinate than the banks. This creates a joint action problem, due 
to the fact that certain agreements on debt reorganization that had once been achieved are, 
in the present context, difficult to achieve. 
• New financial instruments’ growth: The previous situations worsen with the growth of debt 
instruments and derivates, which allow investors to take short-term positions in weak 
currencies through spot, forward and options of the money market. This means that those 
countries having fixed regimes, especially those having unsustainable policies and 
structural weakness, run the risk of suffering speculative attacks to their currency and of 
losing access to the capital market.  
• Growing integration: several papers such as Bayoumi (1990) and Jones and Obstfeld (1997) 
find a growing integration financial pattern since 1973 through the correlation between 
saving and investment. 
• Growing volatility of financial flows: Fischer (1999) mentions that even though the nature of 
the capital movement is not entirely smooth or predictable, the capital flow volatility in the 
nineties seems to be excessive. 
• Growing volume of financial flows: the total of financial flows as proportion of the global 
product showed a slight growing trend between 1974 and 1982, a decrease in the 1983-1989 
period and an important increase in the nineties. 
• Contagion effect: Wolf (1997) defines contagion in the financial markets as the co-movement 
of markets not ascribable to a common co-movement of the fundamentals. The three ways 
that can help to explain this behavior are: the herd behavior –attributed to asymmetric 
information problems-, the portfolio’s composition – which makes that any change in the 
output of an active in a market contribute to modifications in the rest of the composition- 
and the interdependence of the portfolio –which seeks to compensate losses of capital in a 
country with the sell of assets from other markets to increase liquidity in view of the rescue 
of investors-.  
For these reasons, the 1974-1998 period was divided in three sub-periods according to the 
capital flow size, the integration level, the volatility and the dominant financial structure:   17
• 1974-1982: This period was characterized for an international financial structure dominated 
by bank loans and for an abundance of capitals that allowed strong increases of the debts 
that ended with the 1982 crisis.  
• 1983-1989: It was a period of strong reduction in the capital flows as a consequence of the 
debt crisis originated by Mexico in August 1982, which continued with several crises in 
emergent economies such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Nigeria. 
• 1990-1998: Like in the seventies, it is a period of capital abundance, but unlike the former 
the growth of institutions such as investment, pension and insurance funds encouraged a 
growing integration of the international financial system that favored the development of 
bonds and shares markets. The growing volatility of the financial flows appears as an 
outstanding characteristic, which is usually explained by two classes of arguments. On the 
one hand, some associate rational motives based on the fundamentals and; on the other 
hand, there are arguments -about which most agree- that there are additional irrational 
motives, such as the contagion effect or herd behavior, which make the volatility 
characteristic of the international investors appear to be boosted by some level of economic 
frailty. In this respect, Greenspan (1998) points out: “Recent crises, while sharing many, if 
not most, of the characteristics of past episodes, nonetheless, appear different. Market 
discipline today is clearly far more draconian and less forgiving than twenty or thirty years 
ago. Owing to greater information and more opportunities, capital now shifts more readily 
and increasingly to those ventures or economies that appear to excel.” 
Table 5-1 summarizes the characteristics of these periods in two dimensions. On the one 
hand, it differentiates according to capital flow size, trying to reflect the credit availability to a 
global scale. On the other hand, it distinguishes the dominant structure, the characteristics of 
the international credit market and the volatility level with the idea of reflecting the 
conditions or sanctioning potential of the financial market as explained above and as shown 
by Greenspan’s (1998) statement. 
Table 5-1 
 Characterization of different periods of capital flow 
Dominant structure and international credit market 
characteristics 
 
Dominated by banks, 
fairly stability of the 
financial system 
Dominated by the bond market; high 
integration; high volatility of the 
financial system; contagion effect 
Very High    1990-1998 
High 1974-1982   
Size of capital 
flows 
Low 1983-1989   
   18
In this way -maintaining the exchange classification de jure used in models 1, 2 and 3 and the 
structure of variables in model 3- models 4, 5 and 6 refer to periods 1974-1982, 1983-1989 and 
1990-1998 respectively. An interesting result is that the 1983-1989 period appears as the one 
with greater persistence or inertia of the fiscal variables, for those associated to both deficit 
and expenditure. The results obtained are exposed on tables 9-9 to 9-13 and the differential 
effects of fixed regimes in relation to flexible ones are summarized in table 5-2.  
Table 5-2 
Differential fiscal performance of the fixed regime in relation to the flexible one 
 1974-1982  1983-1989  1990-1998 
Total Deficit  (+)  (-)  0 
Primary Deficit  (+)  0  0 
Total Expenditure  (+)  0  (-) 
Primary Expenditure  (+)  0  (-) 
Revenues 0  0  0 
Note: 0 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the fixed 
regime coefficient compared to the flexible one, (+) that this difference is statistically 
positive and (-) that it is statistically negative. 
 
A highly different behavior is observed when the different periods are considered, except for 
the fiscal revenues, which do not show significant differences for any period in comparison to 
the flexible ones. For the 1974-1982 period fixed regimes show a lower disciplinary effect than 
that of the flexible ones, which could be associated to political economy models. That is, in an 
international context with abundance of credit and low initial percentage debts, the presence 
of “weak” and divided governments or governments prone to spend, predict -ceteris paribus- 
laxer fiscal situations in countries with fixed regimes and greater discipline in economies with 
flexible regimes due to the immediacy of the punishment associated to the unsustainable 
fiscal policy. 
For the 1983-1989 period, even if the fixed regime shows greater discipline over the total 
deficit, in general terms it does not show a different behavior from the flexible one as it does 
in the preceding period. Nevertheless, since the influence of the regime does not only depend 
on the possibility of its current strategic use but also on the accumulated behavior up to the 
moment, the fixed regime grouping under a single category does not make it possible to 
decipher its effect, for which future models would broaden this classification. 
For the 1990-1998 period, the fixed regime is likely to have a grater fiscal discipline through 
the expenditure variables, although it does not have influence on any other variable. These 
results are analyzed in the following models in which more information will be available.   19
5.4  Long and short term fixed regimes: Short Peg and Long Peg 
To differentiate -among the de jure fixed- those with long and continuous tradition from the 
rest, the fixed classification is broaden to Long Peg and Short Peg depending on whether the 
fixed regime lasted at least five consecutive years or not. The results obtained are exposed on 
tables 9-14 to 9-18 and the differential effects of fixed regimes in relation to the flexible ones 
are summarized in table 5-3.  
 
Table 5-3 
Differential fiscal performance of Long Peg and Short Peg compared to the flexible one 
   1974-1982  1983-1989  1990-1998 
 Total  Deficit  (+)  0  0 
 Primary  Deficit  (+)  0  0 
Long Peg  Total Expenditure  (+)  0  0 
 Primary  Expenditure (+)  0  (-) 
 Revenues  0  0  (+) 
 
 Total  Deficit  (+)  0  0 
 Primary  Deficit  (+)  (-)  0 
Short Peg  Total Expenditure  (+)  (-)  (-) 
 Primary  Expenditure (+)  (-)  0 
 Revenues  0  (-)  0 
Note: 0 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the fixed regime 
coefficient compared to the flexible one, (+) that this difference is statistically positive and (-) 
that it is statistically negative. 
 
Table 5-3 shows that while in the 1974-1982 period both classes of fixed regimes tended 
toward worse fiscal discipline than the flexible ones, through the deficit and expenditure 
variables, in the 1983-1989 period, the performance was clearly different. Long fixed regimes 
did not have a disciplinary effect different to that of the flexible ones - probably because in the 
absence of international credit the potential costs of maintaining an “unhealthy” fiscal policy 
would be too high. On the other hand, the Short Peg had a greater disciplinary impact on 
both expenditure variables and on the primary deficit, although they showed lower collecting 
capacity and a similar total deficit performance. These results are consistent with the ones 
observed under the so-called stabilizing policies, in which the presence of the inflationary 
processes unfolded by the ongoing monetization of the fiscal deficits make that many 
countries establish fixed exchange rate regimes as prices nominal anchors, while they tried to 
improve their fiscal performance. However, the difficulty in lowering the total and primary 
expenditure, reflected on these variables’ strong inertia -especially in this period-, the 
payment of great interests resulting from the bulky debts, and the decrease in the fiscal 
revenues -partly resulting from the exchange rate appreciation-, did not make it possible to 
have an improvement in the total fiscal balance. Thus, these crises become recurrent   20
phenomena during the period. The results obtained for the 1990-1998 period are not 
sufficiently clear. 
5.5  New exchange classification: The importance of a classification that detect 
inconsistencies 
In considering the central bank commitment affairs to intervene and subordinate its monetary 
policy to the currency market, as the possible inconsistencies in its performance, the new 
classification suggested in section 4 is used. The results obtained for this classification are 
exposed on tables 9-19 to 9-23 and are summarized in table 5-4.  
 
Table 5-4 
Differential fiscal performance of the new classification of fixed compared to flexible ones (g) 
   1974-1982  1983-1989  1990-1998 
 Total  Deficit  0  •  0 
de Jure and   Primary Deficit  (+)  •  (-) 
de Facto Fix  Total Expenditure  0  •  0 
(a) Primary  Expenditure  (+)  •  (-) 
 Revenues  0 •  0 
       
 Total  Deficit  (+)  0 0 
 Primary  Deficit  (+)  0 0 
de Jure Fix and   Total Expenditure  (+)  (-)  0 
de Facto Intermediate  Primary Expenditure  (+)  (-)  (-) 
(b) Revenues  (-) (-)  0 
       
 Total  Deficit  0 0 • 
de Jure Fix and   Primary Deficit  0  (-)  • 
de Facto Flexible  Total Expenditure  0  0  • 
(c) Primary  Expenditure  (+)  0  • 
 Revenues  0 0 • 
       
 Total  Deficit  0 0 0 
de Jure Fix and   Primary Deficit  (+)  0  0 
de Facto Inconclusive  Total Expenditure  (+)  0  0 
(d) Primary  Expenditure  (+)  0  0 
 Revenues  0  0  (+) 
Note: 0 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the fixed regime coefficient 
compared to the flexible one, (+) that this difference is statistically positive and (-) that it is statistically 
negative and • that such variable is not considered in the regression because of the absence of observations.  
 
In general terms, for the 1974-1982 period fixed regimes are bound to lesser fiscal discipline 
than flexible ones. It is interesting to note that the regimes included in (c) – de jure fixed with 
changes in their exchange rates, but not in their reserves- are not clearly less disciplinary than 
the flexible ones. The fact of not having strong variations in their reserves in the precense of 
changes in their exchange rates might be due to the fact that the agents did not expect such 
changes, maybe because their fundamentals –including its fiscal performance - did not 
anticipate such a situation.   21
In the 1983-1989 period many countries with serious debt crises and inflationary processes 
adopted de jure fixed regimes apparently with two objectives: to behave as a nominal anchor 
of prices and to favor a grater fiscal discipline. Literature shows that if the government does 
not have access to credit and/or had insufficient reserves, the monetary financing of the 
deficits would cause an immediate depreciation independently from the exchange rate 
regime. The econometric results are in line with this idea since: 
• (d) - de jure fixed having stable economies, with no greater external shocks or credibility 
problems – did not have a differential effect when compared to the flexible ones. 
• In general terms (c) are still as disciplinary as the flexible ones due to the reasons mentioned 
above. 
• (b) Include most stabilizing plans of the eighties, which were not very effective in reducing 
total deficits. The strong persistence of the fiscal variables in this period, the insufficient 
disciplinary effect of stabilizing policies, and the recurrent re-lining of the exchange rate -
with its punishment in terms of violating a rule and losing credibility- would show that, in 
those economies with a poor fiscal performance and serious inflationary problems, 
governments would have to see such costs with lower weight than the ones that would 
result from a true budgetary adjustment likely to make its fiscal performance consistent. 
• (a) Do not have any observations. This would seem to indicate that to be defined as fixed 
and behave in like manner would be highly costly at times of strong financial restrictions, 
probably due to the fact that the strong inertia of fiscal variables makes it impossible to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate with constant deficits and inflation. 
The 1990-1998 period is, as the sixties, one of capital abundance, with flows greater than the 
ones before the debt crisis. However, the incidence of fixed regimes over the fiscal 
performance compared to that of the flexible ones is highly different for this period. A 
possible rationalization of this uneven performance could be found in the different 
characteristics of the international financial system highlighted above: growth of the bonds 
and shares market, new financial instruments favoring short term positions, higher volatility 
of capital flows and contagion effect. For all this, even though it is a more “calibrated” system 
for rewarding a good performance, it is also so for discipline errors of private investments or 
public policies once they are evident. This greater information and the opportunities make the 
capitals move more easily and each time more to those opportunities more convenient, 
producing a disciplinary capacity more extreme and less “sympathetic” than twenty or thirty 
years ago. This evidence in its most extreme version has led Eichegreen (1994) and Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1995a) to suggest the so-called “two poles” theory, which proposes an inherent 
tension between capital high mobility and countries with fixed regimes wanting to realize a   22
monetary policy with domestic objectives. According to these authors, this occurs due to the 
growing fragility that the greater capital mobility imposes on the exchange commitments, 
which will cause the countries to be forced to choose between flexible regimes or exchange 
rate unions in the XXI century. The main obtained results show that: 
• (a) Have a reversal in sign compared to those of the 1974-1982 period. This could be due to 
the fact that those countries that have undergone external shocks -shown in their reserves 
movement - and have been able to maintain their exchange commitment must have had a 
more disciplined fiscal performance than the flexible ones. 
• (b) Have a more disciplinary effect than the flexible only on the primary expenditure. This 
performance –together with the possible impairment of other fundamentals- probably 
favored, within the framework of highly volatile capital markets subject to panic, the 
exchange rate destabilization. 
• (c) Do not have any observations. This situation would show the limited current 
possibilities of finding a country with de jure fixed exchange regime, which simultaneously 
varies its exchange rates –violating its commitment- without being affected in its reserves’ 
levels. 
• (d) Do not generally have a differential influence over the fiscal variables compared to the 
flexible ones which, within the framework explained above, could be associated with the 
fact that these stable economies with no credibility problems do not need to show a special 
disciplinary performance, since they are not subject to greater external shocks. However, 
they cannot relax their fiscal performance like in the seventies because they would probably 
stop being stable. The underlying idea is that the exchange rate regimes have an impact on 
the economic performance only when they represent a relevant restriction on the economic 
policy, which is likely to happen when the country is subject to significant external shocks.   23
6  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyzed the effect of the exchange regimes on the fiscal discipline, focusing on 
the fixed and flexible difference. The results strongly suggest that such differential effect 
depends on the international context, specifically on the possibility of indebtedness and the 
characteristics of the international financial system. In this respect, the results suggest that the 
traditional view stating that fixed regimes necessarily provide greater fiscal discipline should 
be revised. 
The main conclusions can be summarized in three points: 
•  In situations where there is originally no fiscal discipline and the authorities have the 
possibility of financing with debt with relatively low costs -associated to the low probability 
in the regime collapse or to the low costs in terms of the incidence of such collapse on the rest 
of the economy-, as in the 1974-1982 period, fixed regimes do not provide greater discipline 
per se. On the contrary, flexible ones generate greater discipline because of the immediacy of 
the punishment associated to the unsustainable fiscal policy. This result is compatible with 
models such as those of Alesina y Drazen (1991), Calvo (1986), Tornell y Velasco (1995a, 
1995b), and Velasco (1997) according to which the presence of “weak” and divided or prone 
to spend governments, in a context of abundance of credit and low initial debt percentages, 
produce ceteris paribus laxer fiscal situations in countries having fixed regimes.  
•  In contexts with strong financing restrictions, as in the 1983-1989 period, the monetary 
financing of the deficits will inevitably cause an immediate depreciation, independently from 
the chosen exchange rate regime. Therefore, the disciplinary effects should not be 
substantially different. 
•  On the contrary, in contexts of abundance of capital but where these are highly volatile 
and probably subject to the contagion effect, as in the 1990-1998 period, fixed regimes 
desiring to be consistent should -ceteris paribus- have a greater disciplinary effect compared 
to the flexible ones to diminish the probabilities of having an exchange attack. This is in line 
with what Gavin and Hausmann (1999) suggest, according to whom in the context of high 
economic and financial volatility, the main factor to be protected is being solvent, as 
“...solvency has as much to do with what might happen as what is expected to happen...”. 
That is, “...in order to protect an economy from financial contagion it is not enough to be 
solvent under existing circumstances and those that are expected to prevail; it is also 
important to be solvent under more difficult circumstances that may very well be down the 
road if the world financial system comes under unexpected stress.” Therefore, in the nineties,   24
greater integration, volatility and punishing capacity -associated to greater information flows 
and to the bond market growth-, made the functioning of the international financial system 
itself to be in charge, through its potential punishment, of obtaining an extra disciplinary 
effect by those fixed regime economies desiring to remain like that. This result supports, on 
the one hand, the so-called “Theory of the two poles” suggested by Eichegreen (1994) y 
Obstfeld y Rogoff (1995a) and the empiric evidence found by Collins (1996) and Edwards 
(1996) and, on the other hand, the “fear of pegging” phenomenon. That is to say, if in order to 
possess a consistent fixed exchange rate regime a country must have an extra disciplinary 
effect, greater would the incentive to adopt flexible regimes, or alternatively, those willing to 
behave as fixed ones would have less incentives to define themselves as such so as not to be 
subject of possible attacks to the currency.    25
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8  DATA APPENDIX 
8.1  Countries’ samples 
OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, United States, 
Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Island, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland. 
Non-OECD countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Czech Rep., 
Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, Belize, Bolivia, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mauricio, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Central African Rep., Democratic Rep. of 
Congo, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Rwanda, San Vicente and Grenadines, Santa Lucia, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
8.2  Macroeconomic variables’ definitions 
Deficit/GDP :  Total  deficit/GDP  (WB, MTS). 
Primary Deficit /GDP 
: Déficit total/GDP (WB, MTS) – Interets’ payment/GDP 
(WB, GF). 
Expenditure/GDP :  Total expenditure/GDP (WB, GF). 
Primary expenditure /GDP  :  Total expenditure/GDP – Interets’ payment/GDP (WB, GF). 
Revenues/GDP 
: Total  expenditure/GDP  (WB, GF) – Total deficit/GDP (WB, 
MTS). 
Shock on the exchange terns 
:  ∆ % on the exports’ price*(Exports/GDP) -∆% on the 
imports’ price*(Imports/GDP) (MTS). 
Per capita GDP 
:  Real GDP per capita in constant dollars (international prices, 
base year 1985) (MTS. Based on Penn World Table 5.6). 
Opening  :  Total of trade (imports+exports)/GDP (MTS).  
Inflation 
: Annual % change on consumer‘s price index based on a 
fixed family shopping basket of goods and services (MTS).  
Hyper 
:  Dummy variable taking value 1 if the inflationary variable 
takes a value higher than 150%. 9  TABLES APPENDIX 
Table 9-1 










t-1 0.7341  0.7544  0.9630 0.9628  0.9714 
t-2 0.6461  0.6264  0.9391 0.9368  0.9582 
t-3 0.5313  0.4782  0.9139 0.9086  0.9411 
Obs. 1130  1080  1135  1080  1130 
 
Table 9-2 
De facto  exchange classification criteria used  in Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2000) 
  σe  σ∆e  σr 
Inconclusive  Low Low Low 
Flexible High  High  Low 
Dirty Floatation   High  High  High 
Crawling  Peg  High Low High 
Fixed Low  Low  High 
Note: σe, σ∆e and σr are exchange rate volatility, volatility of exchange rate variations and 
volatility of reserves respectively. 
 
Table 9-3 
De jure exchange rate regime percentage per de facto classification  
De facto classification     
Fixed Inter. Flexible Inconclusive 
Fixed 28%  31%  11%  57% 
Inter. 45%  22%  26%  19%  De jure classification  
Flexible 27% 47%  63%  24% 
 Total  100%  100%  100%  100% 
 
Table 9-4 
De facto exchange rate regime percentage per de jure classification 
De facto classification     
Fixed Inter. Flex. Inconclusive Total 
Fixed 6%  6%  4%  84% 100% 
Inter. 19%  8%  19%  54%  100% 
De jure 
classification 
Flexible 8% 12%  32%  48%  100% 
Table 9-5 
 De facto exchange rate regime percentage by de jure classification  
(excepting inconclusive ones) 
De facto classification      
Fixed Inter.  Flexible  Total 
Fixed 39% 35% 26%  100% 
Inter.  42% 17% 41%  100%  De jure classification   





Average GDP per capita per category 
De facto classification   
Fixed Inter. Flexible Inconclusive 
Fixed 1403  2942  3799  2824 
Inter. 9461  4142  5017  10972   De jure classification  





Average inflation  per category 
De facto classification    
Fixed Inter. Flexible  Inconclusive 
Fixed 11.634  50.462  12.108  8.496 
Inter. 6.290  58.924  20.040  8.072  De jure classification  




Average opening per category 
De facto classification    
Fixed Inter. Flexible Inconclusive 
Fixed 105.67  48.08  60.42  61.14 
Inter. 68.13  34.75  47.75  64.61  De jure classification  
Flexible 55.93  47.90 40.74  54.22 Table 9-9 
Dependent variable: Deficit/GDP – de jure criteria  
 
    1974-1998  1974-1982 1983-1989 1990-1998 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
   FE  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Constant      2.884*** -0.150*** -0.113***   0.295*** -0.264**  -0.273** 
(t-1)   0.400***   0.307***   0.309***   0.251***   0.613***   0.078** 
Deficit/GDP 
(t-2)    0.137***   0.100***   0.098*** -0.137*** -0.106**    0.069** 
Fixed      0.362  -1.390*** -1.539***   1.064*** -1.964**  -0.790 
Intermediate     1.015***   -0.141   0.529   0.621*  -0.302  -2.372*** 
t  -5.978** -5.744***  -3.541** -6.929***  -13.148*   17.548*** 
(t-1)   2.007   1.718***   1.563   0.711  -9.759*   6.448  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2) -11.806*** -22.350*** -22.356*** -2.744   3.074  -14.100*** 
t -0.001*** -0.0009***  -0.001*** -0.002***   0.0004  -0.001** 
(t-1)   0.0003   0.0003***   0.0004***   0.001***  -0.001*    0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0007*   0.0007***   0.0006***  -0.0003   0.001*   0.0001 
t    -0.032***  -0.028**  -0.038    0.010 
(t-1)      0.028***    0.008  -0.035  -0.041  Openness 
(t-2)     -0.020***    0.009    0.069***  -0.014 
t     -0.0004***  -0.011**   0.0007  -0.0005*** 
(t-1)     -0.0005***  -0.016*** -0.003  -0.0006***  Inflation 
(t-2)       0.001***   0.023***  -0.001   0.00008 
Hyper-inflation         1.771***     0.321   1.087 
          
R2   0.51           
Sargan test (p value)      1  1  0.30  0.14  0.48 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
   0.93  0.93  0.30  0.37  0.29 
Number of observations    1313  1217  1183  317  232  244 
Number of countries    83  82  82  58  66  69 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-10 
Dependent variable: Primary Deficit/GDP – de jure criteria 
 
   1974-1998  1974-1982  1983-1989  1990-1998 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
    FE  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Constant      0.798  -0.244*** -0.219***   0.055  -0.229**  -0.081 
(t-1)    0.445***   0.364***   0.370***   0.314***   0.572***   0.291*** 
Primary deficit/GDP 
(t-2)    0.133***   0.098***   0.101*** -0.155*** -0.125**    0.113*** 
Fixed     0.931***  -0.323  -1.270***   1.128***  -1.310   0.002 
Intermediate      1.485***   1.648***   1.375***   0.783***   0.213  -1.635** 
t -11.005***  -10.825***  -11.949*** -12.149*** -20.891***   10.166** 
(t-1)   2.574    1.859**  -3.226* -1.241  -12.583**  -9.228**  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2) -14.083*** -28.693*** -25.973*** -3.116* -0.983  -5.301 
t -0.001***  -0.0001    0.00002 -0.001***   0.00008  -0.001*** 
(t-1)   0.0004  -0.0003**  -0.0002*   0.001**  -0.0008    0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0006*   0.0009***   0.0008***  -0.0002   0.0009   0.001** 
t    -0.042***  -0.018* -0.029  -0.031 
(t-1)      0.062***    0.021    0.007    0.041**  Openness 
(t-2)    -0.049***    0.001    0.021  -0.057** 
t    -0.0003***  -0.017***   0.0003  -0.0005*** 
(t-1)    -0.0004***  -0.017*** -0.005  -0.0007***  Inflation 
(t-2)      0.001***    0.022***  -0.002    0.00006 
Hyper-inflation        0.910     1.975  -2.460** 
          
R2    0.53       
Sargan test (p value)      1  1  0.44  0.37  0.84 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
    0.93 0.69 0.29 0.16 0.13 
Number of observations    1176  1076  1053  289  214  224 
Number of countries    82  77  77  54  61  62 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-11  
Dependent variable: Expenditure/GDP – de jure criteria 
 
   1974-1998  1974-1982  1983-1989  1990-1998 
   1  2  3  4  5  6 
   FE  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Constant     7.645***   0.020**   0.016**   0.699***  -0.363*** -0.179** 
(t-1)   0.637***   0.509***   0.485***   0.221***   0.530***   0.393*** 
Expenditure/GDP 
(t-2)   0.103***   0.061***   0.070*** -0.066***  0.075*  -0.007 
Fixed   -0.288  -0.775***  -0.521**   1.670***  -1.457  -1.237** 
Intermediate     0.177  -0.176  -0.017   0.701***  -1.095 -1.475*** 
t -2.334  -1.677  -0.654 -11.489***  -20.541***    3.900 
(t-1)   8.954***   8.572***   8.147***   1.735  -4.123   5.910***  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2) -11.709*** -24.088*** -22.630*** -3.619**    7.140    1.336 
t -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.0006 -0.002*** 
(t-1)   0.001**   0.001***   0.002***   0.001*** -0.0004    0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0003   0.00008   0.0001   0.0001   0.001*   0.0002 
t     -0.017***  -0.010 -0.035   0.014 
(t-1)       0.063***    0.052*** -0.018  -0.022  Openness 
(t-2)     -0.012***    0.004   0.052**  -0.067*** 
t       0.0001  -0.027*** -0.00005 -0.0006*** 
(t-1)       0.00005*  -0.010**   0.001  -0.00009  Inflation 
(t-2)       0.0005***   0.024*** -0.0007   0.00007* 
Hyper-inflation         1.598*    -0.548    4.357 
          
R2    0.93       
Sargan test (p value)      1  1  0.18  0.02  0.40 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
   0.16  0.31  0.13  0.44  0.27 
Number of observations    1311  1216  1180  330  228  250 
Number of countries    83  83  83  61  65  67 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-12  
Dependent variable: Primary expenditure/GDP – de jure criteria 
 
   1974-1998  1974-1982  1983-1989  1990-1998 
   1  2  3  4  5  6 
    FE  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Constant     6.503***  -0.086***  -0.125***   0.560*** -0.334*** -0.208*** 
(t-1)   0.634***   0.515***   0.461***   0.299***   0.558***   0.335*** 
Primary expenditure/GDP 
(t-2)   0.103***   0.066***   0.062***  -0.133***  -0.066   0.035*** 
Fixed     0.308   0.325**  -0.412   1.825***  -1.381  -0.689** 
Intermediate     0.437   0.420***  -0.100   0.617**  -0.814  -0.900 
t -4.515*  -10.080***  -9.394***  -14.400*** -20.491***   0.905 
(t-1)   12.318***   7.089***   7.494***   1.239  -1.282   8.929***  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2) -13.408*** -23.039*** -22.252*** -4.650***    0.553    1.397 
t  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0002  -0.002*** 
(t-1)   0.001*   0.0009***   0.0009***   0.0009**  -2.93e-06   0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0004   0.0007***   0.0008***  -0.0001   0.0006   0.0008*** 
t    -0.012***  -0.008  -0.041*  -0.018 
(t-1)       0.071***   0.070***   0.005   0.033***  Openness 
(t-2)    -0.041***    0.0009   0.045*** -0.063*** 
t    -0.00005  -0.022***    0.0008  -0.0005*** 
(t-1)      0.0001***  -0.012***    0.001  -0.0001**  Inflation 
(t-2)       0.0004***   0.018***   0.001   0.00001 
Hyper-inflation        0.402   -2.199    1.678 
          
R2    0.93       
Sargan test (p value)      1  1  0.39  0.13  0.49 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
    0.78 0.86 0.25 0.69 0.11 
Number of observations    1188  1088  1063  289  214  234 
Number of countries    82  78  78  54  61  64 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-13 
Dependent variable: Revenues/GDP – de jure criteria 
 
   1974-1998  1974-1982  1983-1989  1990-1998 
    1  2 3 4 5 6 
    FE  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Constant     6.734***   0.021  -0.005   0.508***  -0.311**   0.027 
(t-1)   0.531***   0.376***   0.352***  -0.076**   0.073  -0.036 
Revenues/GDP 
(t-2)   0.197***   0.151***   0.182***   0.020   0.123***   0.058** 
Fixed   -0.558**  -0.639***  -0.593**    0.353  -0.747    0.282 
Intermediate   -0.819***  -1.251***  -0.971***   0.129  -1.080*    1.353*** 
t   2.664   2.487***  -0.948  -0.502   6.210**  -15.300*** 
(t-1)   5.053***   5.641***   5.773***   3.265**   20.304***  -2.104  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2)   0.851   2.132***   3.454***   0.640   10.041***   20.953*** 
t -0.0006*  -0.0008***  -0.0007***   0.0001   8.40e-06  -0.0006 
(t-1)   0.0008   0.001***   0.0009***  -0.0006*  -0.0003   0.0006  per capita GDP 
(t-2)  -0.00009  -0.0001  -0.00008   0.0003    0.002*** -0.0005 
t       0.031***   0.011   0.026  -0.031** 
(t-1)       0.012**   0.026   0.012   0.014  Openness 
(t-2)       0.001   0.020*   0.017   0.026 
t       0.00002   0.001  -0.0006  -0.00003 
(t-1)       0.0002***   0.010**   0.008*   0.0003***  Inflation 
(t-2)       0.0003*** -0.004   0.007***  -0.0005*** 
Hyper-inflation         1.524**    -1.237   1.582** 
           
R2    0.94       
Sargan test (p value)      1  1  0.34  0.21  0.78 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
    0.59 0.82 0.90 0.51 0.67 
Number of observations    1280  1186  1152  316  228  240 
Number of countries    82  81  81  58  65  67 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-14 
Dependent variable: Deficit/GDP – de jure criteria 
 
   1974-1998  1974-1982  1983-1989  1990-1998 
   3  7  8  9  10 
   GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Constant   -0.113*** -0.138***   0.292*** -0.255**  -0.274** 
(t-1)   0.309***   0.283***   0.252***   0.589***   0.076* 
Deficit/GDP 
(t-2)   0.098***   0.088***  -0.138*** -0.109**    0.069** 
Fixed   -1.539***         
Long Peg      -1.755***   1.218***  -2.025  -0.874 
Short Peg      -1.898***   0.901**  -1.924  -0.567 
Intermediate     0.529   0.526   0.591   0.419 -2.411*** 
t -3.541**  -3.349***  -7.113*** -11.914    17.64*** 
(t-1)   1.563   2.130*   0.468  -9.118*   6.73  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2)  -22.356*** -22.031*** -2.943    3.523  -14.003*** 
t -0.001***  -0.0009*** -0.002***   0.0002  -0.001** 
(t-1)   0.0004***   0.0004**   0.001***  -0.001*   0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0006***   0.0006***  -0.0003   0.001*   0.00007 
t  -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.027** -0.038    0.009 
(t-1)   0.028***   0.030***   0.008  -0.037  -0.041  Openness 
(t-2)  -0.020*** -0.021***   0.010    0.069*** -0.014 
t -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.011**    0.0006  -0.0005*** 
(t-1) -0.0005***  -0.0005*** -0.016***  -0.002  -0.0006**  Inflation 
(t-2)   0.001***   0.0001***   0.023***  -0.001   0.00007 
Hyper-inflation     1.771***   2.018***     0.187   1.116 
            
Sargan test (p value)    1  1  0.30  0.13  0.49 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
  0.93 0.96 0.30 0.36 0.29 
Number of observations    1183  1183  317  232  244 
Number of countries    82  82  58  66  69 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-15 
Dependent variable: Primary deficit/GDP – de jure criteria 
 
    1974-1998  1974-1982 1983-1989 1990-1998 
   3  7  8  9  10 
   GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Constant   -0.219***  -0.196***   0.057  -0.201*  -0.072 
(t-1)   0.370***   0.377***   0.317***   0.613***   0.259*** 
Primary deficit/GDP 
(t-2)   0.101***   0.104***  -0.154*** -0.102**    0.113*** 
Fixed   -1.270***         
Long Peg      -1.727***   1.167*** -0.025  -0.301 
Short Peg      -1.255   1.113***  -3.325***   0.801 
Intermediate     1.375***   1.637***   0.789*** -0.095  -1.803*** 
t -11.949*** -5.390  -12.085*** -21.271***   10.127** 
(t-1) -3.226*  -0.234  -1.204 -12.102**  -7.935*  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2) -25.973***  -26.061***  -3.031*    0.166  -5.125 
t   0.00002  -0.0006*** -0.001***   0.003  -0.001*** 
(t-1)  -0.0002*   0.00008   0.001**  -0.0009   0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0008***   0.0008***  -0.0002   0.0006   0.001** 
t -0.042***  -0.036***  -0.018* -0.026  -0.028 
(t-1)   0.062***   0.062***    0.021   0.006   0.034**  Openness 
(t-2)  -0.049***  -0.050***    0.002   0.026 -0.054** 
t -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.017***   0.0002  -0.0005*** 
(t-1) -0.0004***  -0.0004***  -0.017*** -0.004  -0.0007***  Inflation 
(t-2)   0.001***   0.001***   0.022***  -0.001   0.00004 
Hyper-inflation     0.910   2.399**     1.823  -2.461** 
            
Sargan test (p value)    1  1  0.45  0.36  0.83 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
 0.69  0.35  0.30  0.20  0.13 
Number of observations    1053  1053  289  214  224 
Number of countries    77  77  54  61  62 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-16 
Dependent variable: Expenditure/GDP – de jure criteria 
 
   1974-1998  1974-1982  1983-1989  1990-1998 
   3  7  8  9  10 
   GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Constant     0.016**   0.006   0.692***  -0.338**  -0.156* 
(t-1)   0.485***   0.468***   0.223***   0.540***   0.431*** 
Expenditure/GDP 
(t-2)   0.070***   0.059***  -0.066***   0.065  -0.012 
Fixed   -0.521**         
Long Peg      -0.185   1.910***  -0.885  -0.131 
Short Peg      -2.048***   1.515***  -3.441**  -2.999** 
Intermediate   -0.017  -0.165   0.664**  -1.774**  -1.109** 
t -0.654  -1.417  -11.611*** -19.806***   4.619* 
(t-1)   8.147***   8.339***   1.591  -3.838   5.264***  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2)  -22.630*** -22.851*** -3.758**   10.457*   0.908 
t  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.0006  -0.001*** 
(t-1)   0.002***   0.001***   0.001***  -0.0006   0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0001   0.0002**   0.0001   0.001*   0.0004 
t  -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.007 -0.035   0.014 
(t-1)   0.063***   0.063***   0.051***  -0.023  -0.023  Openness 
(t-2) -0.012***    0.011***    0.004   0.063***  -0.063*** 
t   0.0001   0.0001  -0.028***   6.25e-06 -0.0006*** 
(t-1)   0.00005*   0.00002  -0.011**   0.002  -0.00008  Inflation 
(t-2)   0.0005***   0.0004***   0.025***  -0.0002   0.00008* 
Hyper-inflation     1.598*   0.863    -1.246   3.663 
            
Sargan test (p value)    1  1  0.19  0.01  0.43 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
 0.31  0.41  0.14  0.42  0.14 
Number of observations    1180  1180  330  228  250 
Number of countries    83  83  61  65  67 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
   39
Table 9-17 
Dependent variable: Primary expenditure/GDP – de jure criteria 
 
    1974-1998 1974-1998 1974-1982 1983-1989 1990-1998 
    3 7 8 9  10 
   GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Constant   -0.125***  -0.113***    0.569*** -0.266**  -0.225*** 
(t-1)    0.461***   0.484***   0.296***   0.589***   0.325*** 
Primary expenditure/GDP 
(t-2)   0.062***   0. 051***  -0.126*** -0.061    0.035*** 
Fixed    -0.412      
Long Peg       0.084   1.617***   0.604  -0.829* 
Short Peg      -0.855   2.400***  -4.383***  -0.241 
Intermediate   -0.100    0.044   0.638**  -1.186*  -0.983 
t -9.394***  -9.660***  -14.196*** -20.608***   0.055 
(t-1)   7.494***   4.575**   1.452  -0.380   8.878***  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2)  -22.252***  -22.712***  -4.381***   2.449   1.636 
t -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***   0.0002  -0.002*** 
(t-1)   0.0009***   0.001***   0.0007*  -0.0001   0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0008***   0.0008***  -0.00006   0.0002   0.0008*** 
t -0.012***  -0.011**  -0.009 -0.044**  -0.019 
(t-1)   0.071***   0.093***   0.069***   0.005   0.035**  Openness 
(t-2) -0.041***  -0.048***  -0.001   0.049***  -0.062*** 
t -0.00005  -0.0001  -0.022***   0.0009  -0.0005*** 
(t-1)   0.0001***   0.00006  -0.012***   0.001  -0.001**  Inflation 
(t-2)   0.0004***   0.0003**   0.018***   0.0006   5.15e-06 
Hyper-inflation     0.402  -0.404    -2.636   1.249 
         
Sargan test (p value)    1  1  0.37  0.21  0.43 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
  0.86 0.94 0.26 0.66 0.12 
Number of observations    1063  1063  289  214  234 
Number  of  countries    78 78 54 61 64 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   40
Table 9-18 
Dependent variable: Revenues/GDP – de jure criteria 
 
    1974-1998 1974-1998 1974-1982 1983-1989 1990-1998 
    3 7 8 9  10 
   GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Constant    -0.005   0.018   0.500***  -0.308**   0.046 
(t-1)   0.352***   0.324*** -0.069**    0.069 -0.099** 
Revenues/GDP 
(t-2)   0.182***   0.166***   0.164   0.123**   0.019 
Fixed   -0.593**         
Long Peg      -0.482   0.214  -0.676   0.584** 
Short Peg      -1.167**   0.490 -1.035**  -0.856 
Intermediate   -0.971***  -0.749*   0.151  -1.163*   1.400*** 
t -0.948  -2.174  -0.413   6.295**  -15.012*** 
(t-1)   5.773***   5.945***   3.260**   20.283***  -4.278  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2)   3.454***   2.819**   0.832   10.202***   20.872*** 
t -0.0007*** -0.0006***   0.0001   0.0002 -0.0006 
(t-1)   0.0009***   0.0008***  -0.0006*  -0.003   0.0003  per capita GDP 
(t-2) -0.00008  -0.00006    0.0003    0.001***  -0.0002 
t   0.031***   0.033***   0.011   0.027  -0.034** 
(t-1)   0.012**   0.15***   0.025   0.011   0.019*  Openness 
(t-2)   0.001   0.002   0.018**   0.018   0.028 
t   0.00002   0.00003   0.0007  -0.0005  -0.00001 
(t-1)   0.0002***   0.0002***   0.010**   0.008**   0.0003***  Inflation 
(t-2)   0.0003***   0.0003***  -0.003   0.007*** -0.0005*** 
Hyper-inflation     1.524**   1.328    -1.274   1.547 
         
Sargan test (p value)    1  1  0.35  0.21  0.65 
Second order serial 
correlation Test (p value) 
  0.82 0.72 0.86 0.51 0.64 
Number of observations    1152  1152  316  228  240 
Number  of  countries    81 81 58 65 67 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-19 
Dependent variable: Deficit/GDP – new classification  
 
    1974-1982 1983-1989 1990-1998 
    11 12 13 
   GMM GMM GMM 
Constant     0.302***  -0.358***  -0.253** 
(t-1)   0.231***   0.825***   0.077* 
Deficit/GDP 
(t-2) -0.146***  -0.131**    0.076** 
de jure fixed-de facto fixed (a)     1.045     0.605 
de jure fixed-de facto intermediate (b)     2.757***  -1.584  -0.717 
de jure fixed-de facto flexible (c)    -0.066  -1.882   
de jure fixed-de facto inconclusive (d)     0.497  -1.204   0.652 
de jure interm.-de facto fixed or de jure flexible-de facto fixed (e)     0.158   1.009*  -0.625 
de jure interm.-de facto interm. or de jure flexible-de fecto interm. (f)     0.105   1.158  -1.146** 
de jure interm.-de facto incon. or de jure flexible-de facto incon. (h)    -0.087   0.623 -0.180 
t -8.680***  -14.258*    14.424** 
(t-1) -1.932  -6.138    5.870  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2) -4.928***    5.624 -20.762*** 
t -0.001***    0.0008  -0.001* 
(t-1)   0.001***  -0.002*   0.002**  per capita GDP 
(t-2)  -0.0003   0.001*   0.0003 
t -0.025  -0.062**    0.059** 
(t-1)   0.015  -0.009  -0.083***  Openness 
(t-2)   0.004   0.070**  -0.017 
t -0.011*    0.0007  -0.0006*** 
(t-1) -0.027***  -0.005 -0.0007***  Inflation 
(t-2)   0.024***  -0.001   0.0002** 
Hyper-inflation       1.880  -0.089 
        
Sargan test (p value)    0.30  0.14  0.43 
Second order serial correlation Test (p value)    0.15  0.35  0.39 
Number of observations    306  224  232 
Number of countries    56  62  65 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   42
Table 9-20 
Dependent variable: Primary deficit/GDP – new classification 
 
    1974-1982 1983-1989 1990-1998 
    11 12 13 
   GMM GMM GMM 
Constant     0.087  -0.344***  -0.119 
(t-1)   0.323***   0.740***   0.245*** 
Primary deficit/GDP 
(t-2) -0.169***  -0.103    0.116*** 
de jure fixed-de facto fixed (a)     1.194***    -2.071* 
de jure fixed-de facto intermediate (b)     2.396***  -2.199  -0.027 
de jure fixed-de facto flexible (c)    -0.312  -5.186***   
de jure fixed-de facto inconclusive (d)     0.627*  -1.274  -0.524 
de jure interm.-de facto fixed or de jure flexible-de facto fixed (e)     0.920***   0.014  -0.314 
de jure interm.-de facto interm. or de jure flexible-de fecto interm. (f)   -0.266    0.577 -1.974*** 
de jure interm.-de facto incon. or de jure flexible-de facto incon. (h)     0.130   0.056  -0.457* 
t -13.937*** -21.337**   3.216 
(t-1) -2.782  -4.850  -13.543**  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2) -4.224***   3.030  -7.260* 
t -0.001***    0.0004  -0.002** 
(t-1)   0.001***  -0.0007   0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)  -0.0003*   0.001   0.001*** 
t -0.017*  -0.033    0.005 
(t-1)   0.025*   0.014   0.010  Openness 
(t-2)   0.004   0.020  -0.045** 
t -0.019***    0.0003  -0.0006*** 
(t-1) -0.024***  -0.005 -0.0007***  Inflation 
(t-2)   0.025***  -0.001   0.0003** 
Hyper-inflation       2.888  -1.078 
        
Sargan test (p value)    0.42  0.63  0.74 
Second order serial correlation Test (p value)    0.20  0.30  0.13 
Number of observations    279  209  217 
Number of countries    52  57  59 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-21 
Dependent variable: Expenditure/GDP – new classification 
 
    1974-1982 1983-1989 1990-1998 
    11 12 13 
   GMM GMM GMM 
Constant     0.751***  -0.364***  -0.119 
(t-1)   0.144***   0.476***   0.354*** 
Expenditure/GDP 
(t-2)  -0.088***   0.100**   0.019 
de jure fixed-de facto fixed (a)     0.626     0.192 
de jure fixed-de facto intermediate (b)     1.091**  -2.075*  -1.392 
de jure fixed-de facto flexible (c)     0.682   0.605   
de jure fixed-de facto inconclusive (d)     0.752*  -0.598  -0.078 
de jure interm.-de facto fixed or de jure flexible-de facto fixed (e)    -0.554*  -0.297   0.515 
de jure interm.-de facto interm. or de jure flexible-de fecto interm. (f)    -0.038   0.639   0.524 
de jure interm.-de facto incon. or de jure flexible-de facto incon. (h)    -0.695*** -0.179  -0.327 
t -12.290*** -17.400***   4.330* 
(t-1) -0.876  -2.518    7.676***  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2) -4.970***    6.948 -7.922** 
t -0.002***  -0.0005  -0.002*** 
(t-1)   0.001***  -0.0008   0.001**  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0001   0.002**   0.0002 
t -0.017  -0.007    0.004 
(t-1)   0.061***  -0.042  -0.009  Openness 
(t-2) -0.003    0.059** -0.032* 
t -0.034***  -0.0002  -0.0004*** 
(t-1) -0.015***  -0.00005  -0.0001***  Inflation 
(t-2)   0.028***  -0.0012 -0.00001 
Hyper-inflation       0.846   1.585 
        
Sargan test (p value)    0.07  0.01  0.59 
Second order serial correlation Test (p value)    0.11  0.49  0.07 
Number of observations    319  220  238 
Number of countries    59  61  63 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-22 
Dependent variable: Primary expenditure/GDP – new classification 
 
    1974-1982 1983-1989 1990-1998 
    11 12 13 
   GMM GMM GMM 
Constant     0.491***  -0.434***  -0.105* 
(t-1)   0.234***   0.469***   0.429*** 
Primary expenditure/GDP 
(t-2) -0.144***  -0.036    0.054*** 
de jure fixed-de facto fixed (a)     1.123***    -1.458** 
de jure fixed-de facto intermediate (b)     1.081**  -1.476*  -1.813*** 
de jure fixed-de facto flexible (c)     0.866**  -0.721   
de jure fixed-de facto inconclusive (d)     1.071**  -0.545   0.094 
de jure interm.-de facto fixed or de jure flexible-de facto fixed (e)     0.543  -0.126   0.655** 
de jure interm.-de facto interm. or de jure flexible-de fecto interm. (f)    -0.587   0.805  -0.544 
de jure interm.-de facto incon. or de jure flexible-de facto incon. (h)    -0.292   0.056 -0.746*** 
t -16.577*** -14.726***   2.945 
(t-1)  -0.739   3.663   13.518***  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2) -5.107***   3.784  -2.153 
t -0.001***  -0.00001  -0.002*** 
(t-1)   0.0009*  -0.0002   0.001***  per capita GDP 
(t-2)  -0.0001   0.0006   0.0006*** 
t -0.007  -0.028  -0.033* 
(t-1)   0.074***  -0.017   0.047***  Openness 
(t-2)   0.002   0.047***  -0.041*** 
t -0.023***    0.001  -0.0004*** 
(t-1) -0.019***    0.002 -0.00001  Inflation 
(t-2)   0.021***   0.002   0.00006** 
Hyper-inflation     -3.064    0.434 
        
Sargan test (p value)    0.10  0.03  0.58 
Second order serial correlation Test (p value)    0.22  0.45  0.07 
Number of observations    279  209  227 
Number of countries    52  57  61 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9-23 
Dependent variable: Revenues/GDP – new classification 
 
    1974-1982 1983-1989 1990-1998 
    11 12 13 
   GMM GMM GMM 
Constant     0.503***  -0.273**   0.116 
(t-1) -0.099***    0.661*** -0.207*** 
Revenues/GDP 
(t-2)   0.010   0.170***  -0.012 
de jure fixed-de facto fixed (a)    -0.004    -0.773 
de jure fixed-de facto intermediate (b)    -1.420** -2.101*  -0.198 
de jure fixed-de facto flexible (c)     0.180   0.413    
de jure fixed-de facto inconclusive (d)   -0.090  -0.740    0.983*** 
de jure interm.-de facto fixed or de jure flexible-de facto fixed (e)    -0.379  -0.021   0.788* 
de jure interm.-de facto interm. or de jure flexible-de fecto interm. (f)     0.003  -0.085   1.216*** 
de jure interm.-de facto incon. or de jure flexible-de facto incon. (h)    -0.437** -0.026    0.280 
t -0.172    3.864  -10.173** 
(t-1)   1.781   18.516***  -0.476  Shock in terms of trade 
(t-2)   2.732*   5.299   20.668*** 
t   0.0001   0.00003  -0.0002 
(t-1) -0.0005*  -0.0006  -0.0003  per capita GDP 
(t-2)   0.0004*   0.001  -0.0002 
t -0.003    0.033 -0.044*** 
(t-1)   0.030*  -0.017   0.019  Openness 
(t-2)   0.014   0.021   0.014 
t  -0.003   0.001   0.00002 
(t-1)   0.016***   0.005   0.0003***  Inflation 
(t-2) -0.004*    0.002 -0.0005*** 
Hyper-inflation     -4.200***  -0.977 
        
Sargan test (p value)    0.47  0.36  0.60 
Second order serial correlation Test (p value)    0.75  0.37  0.09 
Number of observations    305  220  228 
Number of countries    56  61  63 
Note: *, ** and *** show that the null hypothesis is rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 